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The freedom of alienated reflexive subjectivity in The Stanley Parable 
 
Abstract 
 
The Stanley Parable (Galactic Cafe, 2013) is a game that self-reflexively meditates on the 
relationship between the structure in which choices are presented to the player in first-person 
exploration games and contemporary concerns over freedom. It takes, as its subject matter, its 
own ‘variable expressiveness’, yet must also delimit that expressiveness in order to direct the 
player towards a self-reflexive mindset. The article proposes, by analysing three of the endings in 
the game, that this endeavour necessitates the game to compromise its ‘gameness’ and to move 
towards being a Lukácsian novel caught in an endless interiority; it must maintain a tension 
between giving the player freedom and room for expression, on the one hand, and being tightly 
focused on reflections concerning freedom and meaning, on the other. This reveals something 
about what computer games must sacrifice in order to grasp at meaning and also what would be 
required for a work to indicate that in which freedom consists. It will be argued that neither of 
the two kinds of subjectivity that are detailed by Lukács ((1971) The Theory of the Novel. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press) – the Homeric subject without interiority and the alienated modern 
subject on a Sisyphean quest for meaning – are compatible with freedom. Instead, the carefully 
conceived tensions to which The Stanley Parable gives rise initiates a ‘dance’ that gestures towards 
freedom inhering in a subjectivity which avoids these possibilities. This could only be 
accomplished by being more than both a game and a novel. The implications bear upon the form 
of a medium that can most suitably function as a homology for the aforementioned subjectivity 
that transcends the two Lukácsian poles. 
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Introduction 
The Stanley Parable (Galactic Café, 2013) is a first person exploration game in which you play as 
Stanley, also known as Employee 427, who works in the kind of drab, grey room that evokes 
popular depictions of the early-90s style of office, replete with colour-coded sorting trays and 
steel filing cabinets.1 The epitome of the faceless worker in a bureaucratic machine, Stanley is 
described by the narrator as doing the following kind of work:  
 
Orders came to him through a monitor on his desk, telling him what buttons to push, how long to push 
them, and in what order. This is what Employee 427 did every day of the month of every year, and 
although others might have considered it soul rending, Stanley relished every moment that the orders came 
in, as though he had been exactly for this job. And Stanley was happy. (Galactic Café, 2013). 
 
This idyll is thrown into chaos when one day, Stanley had been at his desk for nearly an hour 
before he realised that no orders were forthcoming. At this point, gameplay begins, and the 
player is plunged into deciding Stanley’s next course of action. As the narrated cut-scene 
 
1 The game was developed by Davey Wreden and William Pugh, and is based on the Source mod game of the same 
name that had been released in 2011 as a Half-Life mod. 
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concludes, the camera comes to occupy Stanley’s field of vision, facing his computer screen, 
referencing the way that the player faces theirs.  
Wandering through Stanley’s deserted office, it becomes clear that this is a game that 
tries to do more than offer a fictive game-world boasting challenges to overcome. It is self-
reflexive on the manner in which choices are presented to the player in first-person exploration 
games. The player is prompted to ask themselves whether they have anything in common with 
their in-game character Stanley, who had hitherto been brainwashed, living day to day in a totally 
administered life. The Stanley Parable (hereafter ‘TSP’) is the story of Stanley’s, and perhaps also 
the player’s, journey towards exploring the very possibility of freedom. It is not, however, a 
simple case of player identification with an office worker on a journey. The way in which 
freedom is explored by the game is through its questioning of whether the possibilities available 
to the player in the game are genuinely significant or meaningful, and the extent to which we may 
feel alienated from even acts of our own volition (within and without computer games); this 
accomplishes a to-and-fro transposition of the general philosophical questions about choices and 
alternatives into the realm of computer games, into the structure by which choices are presented in 
first-person exploration games, and back out from the games again. As such, TSP reflects upon 
its own status as a computer game, and also utilises the medium of the computer game to 
address broader issues.  Through this, we may discern a comment about the connection between 
computer games, their conventions and capabilities, and the perennial anxieties over authenticity, 
freedom, and alienation. If computer games are particularly symptomatic of the forces that have 
shaped the world in the past few decades, and of contemporary subjectivity, then it might not be 
unreasonable to posit that this makes them particularly suited to the task of considering what it 
would now mean to be free. Lucien Goldmann, a disciple of Georg Lukács, believed that:  
 
[t]here is a rigorous homology between the literary form of the novel as we have just defined it following 
Lukács and Girard, and the everyday relationship of men with goods in general – and, by extension, of 
men with other men – in a society producing for the market (1975: 7). 
 
Accepting the tenor of this argument, the question arises as to whether the form of the 
computer game, over and above that of the novel, accomplishes something similar to this today, 
a proposition that has been broadly explored by various commentators (Galloway, 2006; Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2011). However, it will be seen that TSP, in order to 
reflect upon its own status as a computer game, and the connection between the form of the 
computer game and wider contexts, arguably demonstrates a great deal of ambivalence between 
the novel form and the computer game form, which complicates the above proposition. That is 
to say, the form of the computer game itself is arguably inimical to meaning (Kirkpatrick, 2011), 
and must therefore be supplemented by the form of the novel to achieve reflexivity. This move 
consequently jeopardises the purity of its claim to be a game. Nevertheless, TSP is not only also 
an ergodic parable, requiring ‘nontrivial effort’ (Aarseth, 1997:1) to navigate its possibilities, but is 
also evidently aimed at ‘gamers’ – those with a thorough understanding of gaming conventions 
are the best equipped to unlock all of its endings and to uncover its meaning. This ambivalence 
of form, it will be seen, is central to what TSP seeks to accomplish. 
TSP draws heavily upon triggered narration to delve into the themes of freedom and 
choice in games, the nature of game constraints and conventions, putative player transgression 
from authorial intention through glitch exploitation and console cheats, player subversion of 
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narrative direction, psychological manipulation of in-game decisions, and the limits of player 
expression, among other things. On the official site, it is described as: ‘an exploration of story, 
games, and choice. Except the story doesn’t matter, it might not even be a game, and if you ever actually 
do have a choice, well let me know how you did it’ (Galactic Café, 2008). The explicit stance of the in-
game narrative is also that there is no real freedom or choice in computer games - or at least not 
in TSP. Yet there are carefully conceived tensions at stake here. Its narrative decrial of the 
possibility of freedom is at times serious, but is more often tongue-in-cheek. Meanwhile, the 
official site paradoxically suggests that ‘as you explore, slowly, meaning begins to arise, the 
paradoxes might start to make sense, perhaps you are powerful after all. The game is not here to 
fight you; it is inviting you to dance’. This paper will consider that claim. It will analyse TSP’s 
commentary about the possibility of freedom and meaning, and using Georg Lukács’s Theory of 
the Novel (1971), argue that it moves towards the novel form in order to foment antinomic 
semantic ambiguities and give rise to the production of an elusive meaningfulness via the 
alienated reflexiveness of the player who is made to reflect upon the apparent meaninglessness of 
their choices. It is the contemplation of the lack of freedom that produces a most ephemeral 
sense of freedom, which, it turns out, is a line of thought that also yields a critique of Lukács’s 
Theory. The contemporary concern with freedom is caught in the following antinomy: on the one 
hand, it is implausible to subscribe to a view of freedom in which we would appear to lack all 
conflicted interiority, belonging to a unity in which what is to be done is absolutely evident; on 
the other, the capacity for reflection appears bound up with alienation and doubt that can lead 
nowhere other than an endless folding back on itself. As such, a remaining possibility lies in 
somehow finding freedom through the very contemplation of the lack of freedom, via a 
movement beyond both alienation and unity. The significance of TSP lies in what it gives up, as a 
game, in order to be able to reflect on this issue. In doing so, it reveals the limitations of, as they 
have been conceived, the game form and the novel form. 
 
Two types of subjectivity 
The examination of freedom in this paper will be traced via the distinction between two types of 
subjectivity as set out by Georg Lukács in Theory of the Novel. The argument will be that freedom 
cannot lie in either of those two kinds of subjectivity. There will be no attempt to offer a focused 
theoretical critique of the philosophical assumptions made in Theory.2 Instead, my intention is to 
use the poles of the two types of subjectivity as conceptual tools with which to offer a meta-
commentary on TSP’s examination of some of our existing and various intuitions about freedom 
and meaning in computer games (and perhaps beyond them). 
The first type of subjectivity pertains to the kind that inhered in Georg Lukács’s mythic 
Homeric subjectivity, in which the Greek subject of Homer’s time inhabited a telic world of 
‘ready-made, ever-present meaning’, where ‘life and meaning were present with perfect 
immanence in every manifestation of life’ (Lukács, 1971b: 32; 80). This subject cannot be at odds 
with themselves, or feel alienated from the world, and the meaning of what has been done and 
what needs to be done is never in question. It is an existence without any conflicted interiority 
 
2 No doubt the mythological nature of Lukács’s categories, or the presupposition by the author that he could speak 
in a manner analogous to the Spirit’s narration of its own voyage in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, i.e., from a 
position that is coterminus with the novel’s account of the development of its consciousness (de Man, 1966: 528), 
are ripe for analysis. 
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(interior reflection or doubt) since ‘there is not yet any exterior’ (Lukács, 1971b: 30); and it is also 
without any need for interpretation or quest for meaning.3 Perhaps one of the most memorable 
lines in Theory is this one:  
 
Happy are those ages when the starry sky is the map of all possible paths – ages whose paths are 
illuminated by the light of the stars. (Lukács, 1971b: 29). 
 
We can draw a contrast here between, on the one hand, the evocation of Borgesian forking paths 
(Borges, 2000), an aspect that has been of keen interest to hypertext and new media scholars, as 
well as game designers, in which the very structure of the ergodic connotes that it is for the 
individual to choose between more than one viable selection, and on the other, what is being 
lauded by Lukács: that in those happy ages, there was no indecision or doubt, only the sense that 
one’s way was perfectly clear to see.4  
In this age, Lukács claims that it was the medium of the Greek epic that ‘gives form to 
the extensive totality of life’ (1971b: 46). The epic does not give a privileged position to the 
author or the hero’s subjectivity since there was no individuality, in a world of such original unity, 
as we would know it: ‘[t]he subject’s form-giving, structuring, delimiting act, his sovereign 
dominance over the created object, is the lyricism of those epic forms which are without totality’ 
(Lukács, 1971b: 51). The Homeric epic hero was ‘never an individual’ and the theme of the epic 
was ‘not a personal destiny but the destiny of a community’ (Lukács, 1971b: 66). Novalis and 
Hölderlin’s influence in Theory with regard to world in which the Gods have vanished, is 
indubitable. Theory differs from the works of these Romantic poets in not bemoaning the 
absence of a divine presence, but of past human activity and the interiorities that created man-
made works, the epic in particular (Moretti, 2015: 40). As such, it is suited to thinking how a 
medium, like the novel, evidences the interiorities that detract from or cohere with the celebrated 
ideal of the Homeric age. 
Homeric subjectivity is radically different to self-reflexive, self-conscious modern 
subjectivity, in which arises the doubt as to whether we are authentically who we are, and has 
been the concern of thinkers from Rousseau to Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre (Pippin, 
2005: 307). For Lukács (1971b: 60), this has arisen due to the loss of ‘distancelessness’; sources 
of meaning have now become increasingly more transcendent to immediate life. This state of 
social existence has been the case except for the Homeric age and a period of the Middle Ages in 
which the idea of God had provided the locus of all meaning. The modern novel embodies the 
state of having been sundered from the immanence of meaning, and its claim to value depends 
upon the capacity of its author to reflect upon his or her own individual interiority. The depth 
and articulation of their desire, frustration, self-loathing, joy, or grief, folded back upon itself, 
examined, and for that examination to be examined in turn, is demonstrative of the complex 
interiority that forms the object and sine qua non of the novel as biographical form. It is the 
novelist’s subjectivity, treated as an object, which is the putative carrier of meaning. The novel 
 
3 Lukács writes that ‘the happy ages have no philosophy’, since philosophy is always ‘a symptom of the rift between 
“inside and ‘outside’’’ (Lukács, 1971b: 29).  
4 In Borges’ short story, ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’, the protagonist, Yu Tsun, reflects at one point that one 
cannot escape one’s subjectivity, since everything that occurs does so to oneself. His ancestor, Ts’ui Pen’s, 
impossible labyrinth is one in which all men lose their way, which also bespeaks a state of modern alienation from 
an original unity.  
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accomplishes ‘the problematic individual’s journeying towards himself’ (Lukács, 1971b: 80), 
towards self-recognition. 5  Thus, although the scope of the world is limited by the hero’s 
experience of it, the heterogeneous mass of isolated persons and meaningless events ‘receives a 
unified articulation by the relating of each separate element to the central character and the 
problem symbolised by the story of his life’ (Lukács, 1971b: 81). TSP clearly takes such a 
biographical focus, with the opening narrated line to the game being: ‘This is the story of a man 
named Stanley’. Through this, it gets at a ‘hybrid-identity’ (Bourdreau, 2012: 13) between player 
and game character, as explained later.  
However, whilst the novel form is an expression of ‘transcendental homelessness’ 
(Lukács, 1971b: 41), meaning in this age is so utterly elusive that even meaning that originates 
from reflection is ultimately illusory. The authenticity of the novelist’s reflection can always be 
called into question by a further folding back, an even deeper reflection. Lukács himself 
bemoaned this state of affairs; he calls interiority ‘the via dolorosa’ (1971b: 92).6 The subject’s 
role becomes that of ‘a mere instrument’ which functions to articulate the fact of the problematic 
insubstantiality of the world (Lukács, 1971b: 83), one that is unendowed by divine grace.  
For the Homeric subject, on the other hand, the question of freedom simply does not 
arise as there is no (conflicted) interiority as such. Given that the world is replete with meaning, 
there can be no dis-identification or alienation from one’s position within it if one is not radically 
distinct from it, and if to do so calls for a reflexiveness that does not exist. With the advent of 
interiority, self-reflexiveness became possible, particularly those forms that could be described as 
estrangement from not only one’s roles and duties, but perhaps also from one’s own feelings and 
desires – the sense that they are not authentically one’s own. For Lukács, such alienated 
reflexiveness was a pervasive and unavoidable aspect of modern subjectivity. As such, we might 
question whether freedom subsists if the subject is always doomed to a Sisyphean quest, a futile 
search for elusive meaning, to the feeling that they cannot identify with anything that they do as 
genuinely meaningful, that there is no possible choice that can be made that gives them relief 
from ennui.7 If it is only with meaning that we can find identification, escape alienation, and 
Lukács’s analysis of the impossibility of doing so in a condition of transcendental homelessness 
is correct, then an endlessly reflexive alienation is the only possible state of affairs. On this 
analysis, can it be true that the subject with no interiority actually enjoys a greater ‘freedom’ than 
the subject who sees only the problematic insubstantiality of the world? What militates against 
this question being dismissed as a comparison between historically incommensurate entities is 
the aim of Theory itself, which is concerned with stimulating revolutionary change through 
elucidating the conditions of the present as against, and in comparison with, a lost ideal (see: 
Lukács, 1971: 53). Playing TSP explores this issue, as the player is led to reflect upon whether 
 
5 The value system of the novelistic hero, no longer organic but fossilised into convention, allows the interiority of 
the hero to find itself as a separate interiority (Good, 1973: 178), and ‘[t]he novel’s…success and failure, depends 
entirely, as the epic never did, on the author and the power of his interiority to reflect, desire, imagine, interpret, and 
finally, to treat his subjectivity like an object’ (Kurrik, 1975: 106). 
6 He declined to speculate about the reasons for this paradigm shift: ‘[t]his is not the place to inquire whether the 
reason for change is to be found in our progress…or whether the gods of Greece were driven away by other forces’ 
(Lukács, 1971b: 37). 
7 Lukács did believe, however, that there can be ‘great moments - generally they are moments of death’, where a 
glimpse of another reality that holds the meaning of the person’s life reveals itself (1971b: 149), but such moments 
are tantalisingly ephemeral. 
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their own struggles through the ‘via dolorosa’ of the game evince the actions of a Stanley that is 
any freer than the Stanley, one without interiority, that had been happily brainwashed to relish 
the meaningfulness of every moment of his button-pressing.  
Players of computer games have been accused of being enmeshed in a deeper 
embroilment with their entertainment medium than had been the case with recipients of older, 
non-ergodic media forms, existing in what could be called a ‘self-administered reality’ (Retort, 
2005: 187) where subjects already immersed in a commodified and militarised regime are 
provided the means to animate, elaborate, refine, and extend their own commodification as ‘self-
spectacularizing cocreators’ (Wark, 2007: 111). In a planetary regime or system of power ‘with no 
outside’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii), subjects perform the roles required to reproduce the system 
of their own volition. Such a view has been espoused in the literature that discusses the shift 
away from ‘discipline’ to ‘biopower’ and to ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991 [1978]: 102 [655]), 
as the decisive means by which power now operates. Power has come to be almost 
indistinguishable from a subject’s own desires, functioning not in terms of proscription, but as 
enticement through making some actions more rewarding in the eyes of a rational calculative 
subject (Baerg, 2009). As such, the alienation of Borgesian forking paths that effect separation is 
perhaps overridden by the illumination of a new constellation of stars. Choices do not lead to 
interior conflicts if the subject is driven by an interiority that sees one possibility alone as the 
only viable choice. Indeed, the contemporary neoliberal subject has been argued to identify with 
a new kind of unity: the logic of enterprise and, over and above that, with the ‘cosmos’ of the 
world market and market valorisation as self-valorisation (Dardot & Laval, 2013: 284). Such a 
mode of being can often be associated with an instrumentally optimising approach to gameplay 
subject to qualifying considerations (Zhu, 2015). 
Alienation and distancing from one’s own volitions is therefore apposite as a retreat from 
a go-getting entrepreneurial neoliberal subjectivity. Yet it threatens to become a retroactive 
return to the modernist search for an elusive and mythical meaning, which has itself been 
arguably subsumed under late capitalism – neoliberalism has economised artistic self-creation 
into a subjectivity that is its primary engine and product line (Nealon, 2008: 13). Instead, it must 
amount to something more than an individualisation linked to the state (Foucault, 1982: 216). A 
search for freedom through alienated reflexivity cannot be one where the end goal is 
instrumentally defined in advance as a form of maximisation, but nor can it be one that is 
resigned to failure. It may, however, be one that, through some convoluted process, the player 
discovers themselves to be ‘powerful after all’.  
 
The Bounded Labyrinth of The Stanley Parable 
TSP does not feature the complex causal mechanisms and interrelations between quantifiable 
units that characterise many mainstream ‘flow’-inducing computer games. There is no panoply of 
non-diegetic gamic icons on a toolbar that gives the player the challenge of deciding which gamic 
actions to chain together given the exigencies of a situation. The game world itself is a graphically 
bland and causally unresponsive one: the player cannot topple any office furniture or break any 
windows, for example; he or she feels the inability to interact, or even jump, rather keenly in 
comparison to the affordances of most contemporary first-person games. There are no weapons 
or tools at Stanley’s disposal. The way in which the story or intrigue advances is through the 
player’s ability to move through space: entering into the next designated zone, having gone left 
rather than right, unlocks the appropriate narration or cutscene. The particular sequence of 
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narrative that is unlocked constitutes the trajectory towards a determinate ending. Some objects, 
buttons in particular, can be interacted with via the mouse cursor, but the interactive possibilities 
are themselves limited, and the consequences do not generally matter. In effect, the challenges 
and possibilities offered by conventional gameplay have been sidelined in order to foreground 
the meaningfulness of choices that impact upon the ending, upon the development of the story. 
The game is succinctly pared down to plot-consequential decision-making that serves to guard 
against the player’s reflections and deliberations about their predicament, about what it all means, 
from being interrupted by any gameplay that would require concentration and skill-acquisition, 
which would shift the player’s mental focus elsewhere. TSP could, therefore, be understood to 
stand as a work that deals with branching narrative paths requiring input from the player or user, 
as a hypertext, cybertext, or nonlinear text. However, as it will be later argued, the fact that it 
presents itself as a fully-fledged computer game is certainly not irrelevant. Nevertheless, TSP is 
not a game that relies on ‘gameplay’ as such, understood broadly as the element of engaging in a 
feedback loop with the game’s procedures, with the particular challenges of skilfully entering 
sequences of inputs with precision timing, order, accuracy, or in accordance with strategic aims. 
Instead, TSP is about ‘playing’ and navigating a nonlinear story-driven first-person game that 
reflects upon the conventions that pertain to first-person exploration games. Nonetheless, some 
trajectories are by no means obvious to uncover; the game is not simply a linear interactive 
narrative in which the possible routes forward are clearly marked; it takes nous to uncover all 
eighteen endings. In this respect then, it differs from story-driven games such as Dear Esther 
(2012) and Everybody’s Gone to the Rapture (2016).    
Self-reflexivity is not itself a novel development in computer games. The adventure game 
genre, for example, has been notable for its reflexivity (Giappone, 2015). In addition to the 
countless indie titles that might be referenced as evidence, some notable mainstream titles that 
have directly addressed the player-game relationship have included Metal Gear Solid (Konami 
Computer Entertainment Japan, 1998), Spec-Ops: The Line (Yager Development, 2012), and 
Bioshock (2K Boston and 2K Australia, 2007). TSP stands out as an effort that takes gamic self-
reflexivity as its central driving force. Causally responsive gameplay is perhaps antithetical to 
reflexivity, at least in the moment of play, given that it contributes to a total atmosphere in which 
players can lose themselves in the flow of tasks to be accomplished, as opposed to considering 
the significance of the tasks themselves, or the very conditions of possibility set by the game. In 
this way, self-reflexivity has arguably not been a ‘natural’ accompaniment to computer games, 
once they have characterised themselves by good ‘gameplay’ (Kirkpatrick, 2012).8  
In many story-driven games, there are choices that are presented to the player outside of 
the challenges of gameplay in which the player must elect for some course of action that they 
know will impact upon the remainder of the game. This would be a fork in a multicursal 
labyrinth insofar as the game’s story is concerned. The lack of such forks has often been a source 
of complaint from players, which has in turn fed into a glorification of player autonomy and a 
rhetoric of meaningful choice that has been repeatedly sold by the games industry, something 
along the lines of: ‘in this game, your choices really do matter’. The marketing blurb, for example, 
 
8 There is more complexity than I imply here. Games may be conducive to reflexive play at the outset, before we 
have mastered the controls, and keenly feel a gap between what is done by our characters in-game and what we 
wanted to do. They may also be so once we have become extremely proficient and have the mental space to reflect 
on what it is that we are doing, as opposed to frantically achieving the next objective required in order to survive. 
These are, however, generalisations, and call for a longer discussion about games and reflexiveness. 
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for one of the most iconic single-player RPGs made, The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim, tells players of ‘a 
complete virtual world open for you to explore any way you choose…The legendary freedom of 
choice, storytelling, and adventure of The Elder Scrolls is realized like never before… The new 
character system allows you to play any way you want’ (Bethesda Softworks LLC, 2014).   
The Stanley Parable conspicuously boasts no less than eighteen different endings that 
follow from different in-game player choices (Figure 1), which places it well over the standard 
three or four endings in triple-A first-person games.9 But whilst it is unusual for a game to have 
to cater for so many branching outcomes that respond to players’ decisions, there is also an 
implicit encouragement of the player to exhaustively seek out multiple endings by laboriously 
combing through the game. In fact, the game is arguably not completed until all the endings have 
been explored. Some players will register that there are similarities here with the role that ‘Easter 
eggs’ have traditionally played in games in their fostering of a ‘completionist’ mentality amongst 
dedicated gamers; the game is not ‘completed’ after one play through to an ending, but only once 
its most obscure secrets have been uncovered. So on the one hand, the comparatively high 
number of endings seems to indicate a celebration of responsiveness to player choice; but on the 
other, there is an implied expectation for the player to explore all of the endings, which seriously 
mitigates the significance of choosing one ending over another. The counterfactual state of as yet 
unchosen decisions within a bounded labyrinthine, as opposed to truly emergent, branching 
structure very shortly becomes factual: you did not go for the ‘art ending’ this time, but it will be 
the one you uncover three endings later. In this sense, the order in which the endings are 
experienced is arguably unimportant, and the player still exists within a game that, like the novel, 
represents the interiority or subjectivity of its creator. 
TSP features voice actor Kevan Brighting as the ever-present, paternalistic, martinet of a 
narrator, who takes the role of steering the narrative of the game along the lines envisaged by its 
creators. The subjectivity of the narrator is abstruse, often commenting world-wearily on the 
player’s last decision to go through one door over another, which imparts a gamic passivity to 
the player, who must listen if they are to understand the significance of the plot development as 
well as what is claimed to be Stanley’s own (narrated) interior monologue. More than merely 
fleshing out the details of the fictional game world, the narrator’s commentary is very often 
deliberately ambiguous as to whether it addresses the player as Stanley or the player qua player, 
and thus whether he refers to the game world or the ‘real’ world.10 The player is aware that 
references to ‘Stanley’ in the game are made to them, with the narrator often slipping into the 
second-person personal pronoun ‘you’, particularly when the player is directed to perform some 
action. In the ‘work’ ending, Stanley appears to go home to his wife, before things take a strange 
turn and his reality comes apart. To progress, the player must follow the instructions that appear 
on screen, the first of which is: ‘GOOD MORNING EMPLOYEE 427. PRESS ‘G’ ON YOUR 
 
9 There is at least one ending that is not in the diagram; there is what might be called a ‘cold feet’ ending that is 
obtained by stepping onto the cargo lift and then quickly stepping off it as it starts, rather than jumping off it later 
for the ‘death ending’ or taking it to the catwalk for the ‘art’, ‘games’ or ‘space’ endings. 
10 Given that Stanley, the character, has some history, there is slightly more ambiguity in TSP, as to who is addressed, 
than in Sometimes You Die (2014), in which the narration, which questions what makes a ‘game’, rather than how 
freedom is possible, is quite obviously directed at the player, rather than the in-game character – an anonymous 
moving block. TSP stands between Sometimes You Die and various games that have explored what may be called the 
‘player-avatar gap’ (see: Klevjer, 2007) in terms of the abstractness of the game avatar with whom the player might 
identify or fail to identify.  
9 
 
KEYBOARD.’ The player, not only addressed as Employee 427, must also perform Stanley’s 
role on their own computer keyboard.11  
 
 
Figure 1. Eighteen endings. Source: Fenner (2013) 
If we distinguish, between the ‘avatar’ as ‘a playable character (or persona)’ and as ‘a 
vehicle through which the player is given some kind of embodied agency and presence within the 
gameworld’ (Klevjer, 2012: 17), then it becomes clear that Stanley is better understood as a 
vehicle. Shown only for a few seconds from behind in the first cutscene, and wearing a lab coat, 
we only know that he is a Caucasian-looking man with short dark hair. But these are facts that 
are quickly forgotten. As such, Stanley is a far cry from characters that have personalities, 
identities or backgrounds that their designers took pains to craft. Consequently, it would be 
impossible for the player to play TSP with a role-playing approach; his personality had been that 
 
11 This obviously works better for PC players of the game than console players; the PC, after all, is a tool of both 
work and play in a way that consoles are not. 
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of an automaton, and the very act of stepping out of his office, of playing the game, represented 
a rupture from the realm of meaningful/meaningless bliss in which he existed. This is one of the 
techniques employed by the game to have us feel that I, as the player, am the one caught in the 
strange world. Nevertheless, we do know that Stanley the character has a history, and so there is 
still a ‘hybrid-identity’ at stake in our playing as Stanley, which is to say, an identity that ‘does not 
belong solely to the player, nor to the playable character’, but which is ‘a fluid, sometimes 
fleeting form of being that exists somewhere between the player and the avatar (or player 
character) during the process of videogame play’ (Bourdreau, 2012: 13; 86). Perhaps the more 
that we identify ourselves with what we know about Stanley: that he has a boring office job, is 
very unremarkable, and follows instructions, the more we might be inclined to perceive a hybrid-
identity that gravitates towards us as the player. The oscillation between Stanley-as-game-
character and Stanley-as-player-vehicle is done in a way that exacerbates the feeling of an 
unresolved confusion, and which imbues the playing of the game with a keen self-consciousness, 
a paralysing criticality that is hostile to uninterrupted ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) like game 
states.  
The different endings in TSP that we uncover invoke different conceptions of freedom 
so that when taken together as a whole, they can be understood to constitute a meta-
commentary that prima facie, through a process of elimination, denies the possibility of any kind 
of player freedom and meaningfulness of in-game choices. This thereby has the effect of 
promulgating an alienated reflexiveness in the player. The present paper will have scope to 
examine three of the eighteen endings. The ‘bomb ending’ puts the player in a position of 
helplessness, and so refers to a sense of freedom as the capacity to make meaningful differences 
to one’s own fate, which is denied to the player. By extension, this calls into question our 
capacity to be able to make meaningful differences in other, less charged situations. The ‘art 
ending’ challenges the player’s willingness to play or work repetitively for the mere promise of 
instrumental reward, asking whether freedom can inhere in the willingness to accept such 
inducements or arrangements. Thus, the sacrifice of the present for the future through 
work/play that is not intrinsically enjoyable is problematised. The ‘life ending’ scrutinises the 
player’s compliance with the narrated story, asking whether willing compliance with instruction 
can be compatible with freedom and happiness. Once these possibilities have been progressively 
eliminated, we might reach a realisation from which it becomes possible to step beyond both 
alienation and unity.  
 
Follow Instructions to Break Free of Mind Control 
The ‘life ending’ is the one obtained by following the narrator’s pre-emptive account of events. 
The first significant decision available to the player, after deciding to play at all and leave 
Stanley’s office, is a choice between two doors (Figure 2). It is, in popular culture, the most 
archetypal representation of a decision between alternatives. The narrator emphatically declares 
that Stanley goes through the door on the left. Should the player follow this ‘script’, and continue 
to oblige with subsequent narrator instructions, Stanley ends up discovering a cavern of screens 
that evidence the secret surveillance to which he and his co-workers had been subjected. They 
had all been under the sway of a piece of mind control machinery that had hitherto robbed them 
of their volition. The obedient player, as Stanley, proceeds to turn it off for good, and exits the 
facility into a promising green, sunlit world. But when the ending cutscene unfolds, any 
exaltation that the player might feel is threatened by an ominous part of the ending’s narration: 
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‘[t]his was exactly the way, right now, that things were meant to happen. And Stanley was happy’ 
(Galactic Cafe, 2013). Yet we can of course recall that Stanley had also been explicitly described 
as ‘happy’ when he was Employee 427, pushing buttons upon instruction and prior to 
discovering that all of his actions had been controlled. This ending was indeed the way that 
things were ‘meant’ to happen according to the narrated story – it is obtained by not deviating 
from the narrator’s pre-emptive descriptions of Stanley’s actions. So when the narrator had 
stated that Stanley took the door on his left, the player had dutifully complied. If the 
brainwashed Stanley had existed in a state of perpetual compliance, and had previously lacked all 
interiority, then the question is posed as to whether the player, in taking over his destiny, had 
demonstrated any newfound interiority. 
 
 
Figure 2. The first forking path. Source: In-game screenshot taken by the author. 
 
This ending of the TSP can be seen to comment upon those instances, when we play 
computer games, where we go along with, as it were, the designer’s expectations. This is often 
quite unavoidable in the early stages, as we follow the more obvious plays due to not knowing 
other possibilities. Or we might temporarily acquiesce to the game’s instructions, rather than 
attempt to become a so-called subversive player, in order to see what it has to offer, which does 
not amount to a promise to follow all future in-game instructions. It is in fact arguable that the 
ethical or open-minded approach is to submit, to give the game its chance, as it were, to reveal 
the vision of its developers (Sicart, 2011). Further, we arguably cannot avoid having to learn the 
steps of the ‘dance’ from the game in order to hope to dance to our own tune at some later point. 
Nevertheless, in some games, the learning and execution, rather than the subsequent creative 
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development, may be all that there is, whilst in others, the gameplay might be so compelling that 
we forget to do anything other than repeat the dance that we have been taught.  
Compared to many of the other endings, Stanley’s fate here is arguably a remarkably 
good one (death or madness are avoided, at least); the chain of decisions leading to it are perhaps 
comparatively more sensible than those leading to other endings, but it is the freedom of the will 
underlying them - the player’s will - that is impugned. TSP provokes the player to doubt their 
own intentions. Have I been happily duped into complying with the designer/narrator’s vision of 
the story, blindly following it, or had that trajectory actually coincided with my own desires and 
good judgment? This line of thought leads to an indefinitely extendable retrospective dissection 
of our own intentions, to that self-reflexive alienation. If the ‘authenticity’ of any satisfaction 
with the status quo, or given state of affairs, is always haunted by the concern of manipulation or 
false consciousness, then the further question is whether it is ever possible for an action of 
compliance to be free.  
 
The Lack of Capacity to Effect any Difference 
In the ‘bomb ending’, Stanley sets off the countdown to nuclear detonation by not turning off 
the mind control machinery as the narrator had advised. The narrator, displeased at this 
disobedience, suddenly seems to be able to arbitrarily affect the plot at his whim. He 
nonchalantly adds into the story the existence of a fail-safe device (nuclear detonation) in the 
event of activation without proper DNA authorisation, proclaiming that he wanted to see 
Stanley made humble for his actions. As the player rushes around the facility, they cannot fail to 
notice the sheer number of brightly coloured control buttons (Figure 3). The fact that pressing 
them is not completely inconsequential (they do cause things to happen, but cannot forfend the 
catastrophe), prompts the player to hope that a correct sequence of button-pressing can avert the 
detonation. Meanwhile, the narrator is persistent in his mockery:  
 
[D]id you just assume when you saw that timer that something in this room was capable of turning it 
off?...Everything! Anything! Something here will save me!...Why would you think that Stanley? That this 
video game can be beaten, won, solved? Do you have any idea what your purpose in this place is?  
 
The lack of capacity to effect any real difference is suppressed by the hope that some untried 
button combination or series of actions can avert the countdown. It is, in gamic terms, an aporia 
without a concomitant epiphany (Aarseth, 1999). This scenario effectively makes a mockery of 
the player’s delusions of their own causal power, which no doubt is an aspect of gaming literacy 
that has resulted from having always been given the chance to make the crucial difference when 
there is a hint of a choreographed in-game opportunity to do so. Such is the weight of the 
acquired literacy and the strength of convention that especially curious or stubborn players might 
feel challenged to play that ending multiple times in order to exhaustively rule out whether there 
was something or other that might have made all the difference. Players expect games to impart 
them with a ‘contract’ in which the terms of good and poor performance are spelled out, along 
with the possibility of attaining the former.  
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Figure 3. Buttons everywhere but none that can save Stanley. Source: In-game screenshot taken 
by the author. 
 
This can be contextualised against a rather pervasive rhetoric that has accompanied many 
genres of games, but particularly in first-person story-driven games, which assures the player that 
their decisions exert tremendous impact upon the game world, and are profoundly meaningful 
insofar as they shape the destinies of so many. But more so than just industry rhetoric or 
marketing hype, as we have seen, it is manifest in the games themselves, where NPCs dote upon 
the play-protagonist’s every deed and affirm their status as the sole agent of change. TSP’s ‘bomb 
ending’ serves up a dose of brute unresponsiveness that decentres the player from the throne of 
causal agent primus inter pares. It is as though a solipsistic idealism, where the very existence of the 
game world itself and its possibilities being built around the capacities of the protagonist by an 
intelligent, benevolent designer, has been dispelled. Yet there can be no denying that the player is 
evidently still the focus of the narrator’s ire and the motor for action, albeit incapable, after a 
point, to exert any action that will make a difference. 
 
The Freedom of Self-Exploitation 
The ‘art ending’ sets up a challenge that is immensely trying if only due to the banality of its 
repetitiveness. The player is told that they must press a single red button continuously, for four 
hours, in order to prevent the cut-out of a crawling baby from reaching a fire, which would result 
in failure. This is done to the accompaniment of the auditory torment of the baby’s wailing, the 
jarring buzzer noise following every press, and the narrator’s periodic exclamations that the 
whole exercise is a ‘work of art’. About two hours later, a puppy is added; it is being lowered 
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towards a piranha-filled aquarium, and the player must now also press a teal button to foil this, 
dashing back and forth frantically between red and teal buttons. The alternative is to forfeit the 
previous two hours of effort. Only if this is maintained for an additional two hours is the ‘art 
ending’ given as a reward.  
Springing a new demand, a new ‘degradation’ in the form of the teal button, on the 
player after they have already committed themselves to the terms of a task that they believed 
themselves to have understood tests the continued resolve of the player to the pursuit of the 
desired instrumental reward - unlocking the ending. The player might ask themselves: what are 
the lengths to which I will go? And could I have possibly have made a genuinely free choice to 
do so? Within the purview of computer games, finding that the terms of the game have suddenly 
changed as one plays is certainly a familiar experience since we are still, as players, uncovering 
mechanics that we may like or dislike even after we have sunk many hours into play. The terms 
of the ‘contract’ in full, as it were, are withheld from us. Whilst this explorative aspect can be the 
sine qua non of gameplaying for some - the discovery of the rules and the testing of tentative 
hypotheses one has for how the game operates can be more interesting than the other elements 
of the game - the dark obverse of this ought not be ignored. Do we have the resolve to throw it 
all in if developments are not to our liking, or has the game already exerted a hold on our more 
compulsive instincts? In this regard, the monotony here evokes, but also differs from, the 
‘Desert Bus’ minigame in Penn & Teller’s Smoke and Mirrors (Imageering, unreleased), in which 
players must complete a gruelling eight hour drive between Las Vegas and Phoenix, Arizona 
without pausing. There, the terms of the game were clear from the outset; new demands did not 
suddenly materialise.  
The repetitiveness and reward obviously references grinding and farming, and perhaps 
the regret that gamers feel at having realised that they have expended so much time in a game. 
The paltry reward that is obtained here for one’s labours is nothing less than ‘transcendence and 
oneness with the beauty and essence of all beings’ (Galactic Café, 2013), which entails a clichéd 
numinous moment: encountering ‘The Essence of Divine Art’ - a simply rendered black 
monolith. The absurdity of using only a small part of one’s full faculties, of performing actions 
that could easily be substituted by a macro, as the means by which to realise something so 
transcendently artistic is the means by which this performance can be seen to embody a 
commentary about play/labour in certain computer games and the concomitant reward. That is 
to say, players are often subjected to hysterical praise for achievements that amounted to little 
more than following a clear set of instructions, and this is one of the inducements by which they 
are supposed to continue playing. If we have voluntarily unlocked this ending through rote 
action, it could well be asked, firstly, whether we were enticed by the inducement of reward for 
rote action. The quality of the process is sacrificed or overlooked in favour of the perceived 
outcome, which, in this case, is one that mocks this very order of priorities. And even as the 
player feels that they are clued in to this particular point, they had no resort but to submit to the 
logic in order to unlock the ending. We could also ask if the keenness for such banal rote action 
is due to the unpalatability of all the other options that I, the player, had for spending that slice 
of time (alternatives both inside and outside the game), which thereby again raises the question 
about one’s freedom – how can one be free if this is what one ‘chooses’ to do voluntarily?  
The self-exploitation here references the changing boundaries between repetitive, 
mechanical ‘play’ and work that masquerades as enjoyable. The historical turning point in 
question has been elucidated by writers such as Klossowski (1994 [1970]), whose examination of 
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the way we find perverse pleasure in labour dates to the moment of transition between an 
industrialised model of labour, organised by management, in which the worker feels exploited 
and unrealised, to a connexionist, project-based model, structured by networks, in which the 
worker is arguably even more exploited but feels greater fulfilment and autonomy (Bishop, 2012: 
236). The exploitation of Uber drivers, for example, is repressed by an advertising campaign that 
emphasises the promise of autonomy with statements like ‘587 miles closer to opening a new 
restaurant’, and ‘481 miles closer to becoming a homeowner’ (Gwynn, 2016). Desert bus drivers, 
falling more into the industrialised model, arguably have a comparatively better deal. In any case, 
the gameplay contract in the ‘Desert Bus’ game was more transparent, and not shot through with 
overblown promises of one’s achievement as a form of inducement.  
 
Conclusion 
The three endings examined have progressively eliminated the sense of a gamic freedom insofar 
as freedom is defined as: not doubting one’s own reasons for complying with instructions; being 
able to effect a difference; and not being compelled to self-exploit. Together with the other 
endings, which lie beyond the scope of this paper, the player is led to reflect upon what the 
conditions of possibility for freedom might be. If these conditions of possibility are consequently 
decided to be unachievable, either under present social conditions, or in an even more pervasive 
sense, then a realisation may be catalysed in the player that leads them to redraw or reassess their 
intuitions and ideas about what it means to be free, to pragmatically reassess the conditions of 
possibility in light of what is achievable. This is perhaps what was alluded to on the official site as 
the game’s invitation to the player to ‘dance’, one that reveals the player to be ‘powerful after all’. 
That is to say, after a particular process has occurred or journey undertaken.  
On the one hand, such a move can be regarded as a woeful abandonment, however 
pragmatic, of a crucial utopian impulse, due to pervasively alienating social conditions.12 Yet on 
the other hand, it opens up a critique of the philosophical and political suitability of Lukács’s 
notion of a telic world of ready-made meaning. The assumption that there has been a profound 
sundering from a time of meaningful bliss into a wretched state of alienation can foment a 
profound criticality of the present that does not subscribe to a vision of how things could be 
better that is limited by existing imaginaries, but it is also doubtless potentially problematic for 
various reasons. Firstly, it is disputable whether this kind of mentality actually inhered for the 
Homeric Greeks. Lukács had based this assessment more on the image of the Greeks in German 
culture, including the writings of Hegel and Friedrich Theodor Fischer, than on any sustained 
historical analysis (Jay, 1984: 93).13 Secondly, the possibility of a return to the original unity, as 
well as the implications of any attempt to do so ought to be considered. Adorno, for example, 
judged these intentions as harmful, writing that it would be a regression to a pernicious state, to a 
‘blind subjugation to nature’ and a ‘real barbarism’ (1978: 499).  Instead, the task is to ‘use the 
force of the subject to break through the deception of constitutive subjectivity’ (Adorno, 1973: 
xx). And thirdly, if this holism sits at the boundaries of comprehension; in what respect, then, is 
 
12 The efficacy of an explicitly self-conscious utopian drive or imaginary is, however, questionable. Jameson (2005), for 
example, wonders if Bloch’s detection of a utopian impulse encompassing everything is most effective when it 
reveals its operation where it is concealed or repressed, rather than where it is deliberate and fully self-conscious. 
13 For Deleuze, the Hellenistic Greek male citizen was actually the first to form an interiority that marks him as a 
subject, marked by the effect of a force which is folded back upon itself, which is by no means a monolithic kind of 
interiority (Deleuze, 1999 [1988]: 83).  
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the requisite mental state different to the lack of interiority that we ordinarily associate with 
brainwashed individuals or religious fanatics for whom there is only one righteous way against all 
other sinful deviations?  
As such, in discussions concerning freedom, the dogmatic pining for an original unity 
might be replaced by an alternative that utilises the possibilities within the vitiated subjectivities 
available to us to effect a break from them, which is to acknowledge that freedom inheres.14 It is 
to use the force of our alienated subjectivities to break from alienation. In the process of 
foregrounding the player’s alienated reflexive subjectivity in TSP, there is an implication, contrary 
to Lukács, that the conditions of possibility for freedom reside in doubt and in the conflicts that 
come with interiority, and that these may actually be preferable to a state of so-called meaningful 
bliss. These can be dimensions that are elegantly explored by the ergodic work that does not 
aspire towards a harmonious sensation of play, a feeling of immersive ‘flow’, or non-
contradictory experience in which indecisiveness or doubt are expunged. The interactive, ergodic 
work is typically defined as generating multiple sequences of events so that what the interactor 
experiences is ‘one actualization among many potential routes within what we may call the event 
space of semio-logical possibility’ (Aarseth, 1999: 32). This ‘experience’ of ‘one actualization’ is 
of a different order to the process of interpretation that takes place on the basis of and as a result 
of the sensory data, as Aarseth (1997: 3) distinguished between ‘variable expressiveness’  and 
‘semantic ambiguity’. When a computer game takes, as its subject matter, rather than as its structure, 
that variable expressiveness, so that it is part of and integral to the semantic ambiguity, then 
there may be a tension between a reflection upon itself, and enabling free play.  
TSP has kept a tight rein on the array of possible player actions so that significance is not 
unwittingly diverted to any virtuoso player achievements, absurd coincidences, or feats of skill. It 
eschews many conventional gamic foci - complex causal connections, proliferating emergent 
structures, the aporias and epiphanies of solving puzzles or vanquishing opponents. In this 
respect, the game’s invitation to the player to dance is not a dance with its causal, processual 
dynamics, with the way in which its algorithms come alive on screen and enter into a feedback 
loop with the player’s sensorium, but with the expression of its ideas. This aligns it with the form 
of the novel. The emergent possibilities and forking paths that might supplant the intended 
authorial expression must be delimited, as they would risk plunging it into the ephemerality of 
the mere game.15 Yet although it has eschewed gameplay challenges, it has retained an evocative 
labyrinthine structure that at least initially gives the sense of an impressive array of unexplored 
possibilities; the player is made to feel that there is still some crucial essence of gameness present 
that enables it to effect a succinct commentary about the structure of all games. It could be said 
to be, like the novel that aims to reflexively comprehend the conditions in which novels exist, a 
game that understands its own ‘gameness’, which thereby makes this reflexiveness the subject 
matter, but which has also had to disavow that very gameness in order to demonstrate its self-
reflexive awareness.  
 
14 Cf. Heidegger (2002), who sees freedom not as a property of man but as the ‘awesome’ (ungeheuerliche) ground of 
the possibility of existence, causality, the deconcealment of beings as such, and of time itself. 
15 For some commentators, this may be sufficient to evict it from the category of the ‘game’; Sicart (2011: Against 
procedurality section, para.12), for example, thinks that there is ‘an exceptionalist argument to make about games’, 
which is that they ‘belong to the players’ given that the expressive act of playing the game ‘contradicts the very 
meaning of authorship in games’. 
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Its own ambiguous status brings out the dissonance between two objectives: to give the 
player freedom and room for expression (to be a ‘good’ game), and to be a tight and cogent work 
that provokes reflection about freedom and the possibility of meaning (to be a ‘good’ Lukácsian 
novel/work of art).16 The significance of achieving this ambiguous status lies in TSP’s gesturing 
to a mode of subjectivity that lies beyond the two modes that have been explored in this paper. 
The details of such a subjectivity have not yet crystallised, but it appears that neither the novel 
form nor the game form simpliciter, as they have been outlined, are suitable homologies for it. 
What can be said, however, is that a work that explores one’s having the interiority to choose 
one path from among many, together with the comprehension of this fact, can be said to be an 
indicator of alienation whilst also effecting a movement towards freedom insofar as it instigates a 
‘dance’ that moves the subject towards the aforementioned subjectivity.   
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